"The Distributional Effects of Disinflationary Monetary Policy" by Willem Thorbecke
The  Distributional  Effects  of 
Disinflationary Monetary Policy 
by 
Willem Thorbecke* 
Working Paper No. 144 
July  1995 
*George  Mason  University  and  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College ABSTRACT 
Macroeconomists  traditionally  focus  on  the  aggregate 
consequences  of disinflationary monetary policy, not its 
distributional  effects.  This paper considers these distributional 
effects.  The  evidence  indicates  that  contractionary  monetary 
policy  harms  interest  rate-sensitive  industries  by  depressing 
output  and employment and increasing the cost of capital.  These 
industries are further hurt as declines in output and increases in 
the cost of capital reduce capital formation.  The evidence also 
indicates  that  tight  monetary  policy  in  1981-82  decimated  the 
earnings  of  small  firms.  These  earnings  have  remained  at  low 
levels  since then.  Finally, the evidence  indicates that wealth 
holders  are helped by contractionary monetary policy as interest 
rates increase and inflation declines.  Before tightening monetary 
policy  to  pursue  these benefits, however,  policy  makers  should 
weigh  carefully  the damage  that they will  inflict  on  interest- 
sensitive  sectors and small firms. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Macroeconomists  traditionally  use  the  aggregate 
demand/aggregate  supply  apparatus  to  analyze  the  effects  of 
disinflationary monetary policy.  A monetary contraction is  modeled 
as reducing aggregate demand.  Assuming an upward-sloping aggregate 
supply curve, the contraction reduces aggregate output and prices. 
Wages and price are then assumed 
to  full  employment  with  lower 
to decline, returning the economy 
inflation.  For  instance,  this 
framework  is  often  employed  to  explain  the  monetary  policy 
experience  of 1979-82.  In October 1979 Federal Reserve Chairman 
Paul  Volcker  implemented  tighter  monetary  policy  to  fight 
inflation.  The economy suffered two recessions over the next three 
years, with the 1981-82 recession bringing the unemployment rate to 
a  post-War  high  of  over  10  percent.  Inflation  finally  began 
declining in 1982, allowing the Fed to loosen  monetary policy.  The 
economy  then  started  a  92-month  recovery  in  November  1982. 
Inflation  since  1983 has  averaged  3.7 percent,  compared  to  an 
average over the 1979-81 period of 9.4 percent. 
What this traditional analysis of disinflation ignores is how 
the burdens of such a policy 
the most?  In what ways are 
are shared.  What sectors are harmed 
they harmed?  How long does it take 
them  to  recover?  Do  any  sectors benefit  from  disinflationary 
policy? 
This  paper  addresses  these questions  by  surveying  several 
studies by the author and others and by bringing new evidence to 
bear on the question.  The results indicate that firms in interest 
rate-sensitive  industries and small firms bear a disproportionate 2 
burden  from contractionary monetary policy.  Output and employment 
following a monetary contraction begins  declining in interest rate- 
sensitive sectors on average eight months after the policy changes, 
reaches  its  lowest  level  after  18 months,  and  continues  to  be 
affected  for 33 months.  The cost of capital in these sectors can 
increase by 10 percentage points or more because of their exposure 
to monetary policy.  These decreases in output and increases in the 
cost  of  capital  retard  capital  formation  in  the  affected  ., 
industries, multiplying their losses.  Small firms Suffer even more 
from  disinflationary  policy.  Earnings  of  small  firms  were 
decimated  in 1981-82 by the Volcker deflation.  Since then these 
earnings have remained at historically low levels.  The evidence 
also  indicates  that  wealth  holders  gain  over  time  from 
contractionary  policy  as  interest rates  increase  and  inflation 
declines.  These and other benefits of disinflation come, though, 
at  significant 
small firms. 
Section  2 
costs to  interest rate-sensitive 
provides a  theoretical background 
Section 3 summarizes 
discussion.  Section 
sectors  and  to 
for this paper. 
the empirical findings.  Section 4 contains a 
5 concludes. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Textbook models (e-g.,  Dornbusch and Fischer, 1994)  teach that 
contractionary  monetary  policy  raises  interest  rates  and  thus 
restricts demand in interest  rate-sensitive sectors.  According to 
Jones  (1994) and  Caves, Frankel, and Jones  (1994), examples  of 3 
industries  that  are sensitive  to interest  rates  include  aircraft, 
automobiles,  capital-goods,  construction,  and furniture.  As output 
slows  in these  industries,  other  cyclically-sensitive  industries 
such  as  those  producing  durable  goods  should  also  contract. 
Industries  producing  necessities  such  as  food,  apparel,  or 
utilities  should  show the  least decline,  since people  continue  to 
require  these  items even during  slowdowns. 
While  traditional  models  imply  that  interest  rate-sensitive 
industries  and  cyclical  industries  should  bear  the  brunt  of 
disinflationary  policy,  recent  work  has  emphasized  that  credit- 
constrained  firms will  also suffer  from tight money.  As Bernanke 
(1993) and Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1994) have discussed,  firms with 
better  balance  sheet  positions  are  more  able  to  finance  their 
activities  either  directly  using  their  own  funds  or  indirectly 
using  their  net worth  as collateral  to obtain  credit. 
have weak balance  sheet positions or that are otherwise 
in their  access  to capital markets  are more dependent 
finance  inventory  investment  and capital  formation. 
Firms  that 
constrained 
on banks  to 
For these credit-constrained  firms, a monetary contraction  can 
severely  curtail  their  ability  to  operate.  As  Gertler  and 
Gilchrist  (1994)  have  discussed,  a  monetary  tightening,  by 
increasing  interest rates, can worsen cash flow net of interest and 
thus  firms'  balance  sheet  positions.  As  Bernanke  and  Blinder 
(1988)  have  shown,  a monetary  contraction  engineered  through  an 
open  market  sale  by  the  Federal  Reserve  can  decrease  bank  loans 
(assuming  that  bonds  and  bank  loans  are  imperfect  substitutes). 4 
The  reduction  in  collateralizable  net  worth  and  in  bank  loans 
caused by a monetary contraction restricts working capital and thus 
economic  activity  among  firms  with  limited  access  to  capital 
markets. 
Gertler and Gilchrist have argued that smaller firms are more 
likely to be constrained in their access to credit.  They are more 
likely  to  obtain  funds  from banks  than  from equity,  bonds,  or 
commercial paper.  They are less likely to be well-collateralized. 
Further,  Gertler  and  Gilchrist  argued  that,  because  credit 
constraints  bind  a  larger number of small  firms  in a downturn, 
changes  in monetary policy should have a larger effect on small 
firms in bad times than in good times.  A monetary contraction when 
the economy  is in a recession can have a much more serious effect 
on small firms than a monetary expansion would when the economy is 
growing.  Thus,  if  credit  constraints  help  propagate  monetary 
policy,  small  firms  should  suffer  more  from  disinflationary 
monetary  policy, especially during recessions. 
While  tight monetary policy can reduce capital formation by 
credit-constrained  firms, there are also other channels  through 
which  it  can affect investment.  By decreasing output and sales in 
interest rate-sensitive or cyclically-sensitive industries, it can 
decrease capital formation in these industries. Chirinko (1993,  p. 
1883), in a recent survey of research about investment, concluded 
that llinvestment  is  most sensitive  to quantity variables (output  or 
sales) with price variables  having only a modest effect."  Further, 
by  increasing  uncertainty  in  interest  rate-sensitive  sectors, 5 
monetary  policy can also deter investment.  Pindyck and Solimano 
(1993) have argued ,that an increase in uncertainty  about future 
cash flows is a major deterrent to investment. 
Pindyck and Solimano model uncertainty as being due to various 
macroeconomic  variables.  In the language of  finance, there  are 
certain systematic sources of risk that affect cash flows, interest 
rates,  and  asset  prices.  Assets  must  pay  increments  to  their 
returns  (risk premia) to compensate for their exposures to these 
risk variables.  One general way to  model  this relationship between 
risk and return has been developed by Ross (1976).  He posited that 
the return on asset i (ri)  is given by: 
Ifi  =  rf  + CjPij~j  +  C,Pijfj  +  Ei  (1) 
where  rcf  is the risk-free rate, Pij  is the exposure of asset i to 
macroeconomic  variable j,  hj  is the risk premium  associated with 
macroeconomic  variable j,  fj  is the unexpected change in variable 
j,  and  ci is a mean-zero  error term.  If monetary  policy  is  a 
systematic source of risk, then it can increase uncertainty about 
future  cash  flows  and deter  investment.  Those  industries with 
greater  exposures  to  monetary  policy  (those  with  larger  @ 
coefficients) should be more affected by the riskiness of monetary 
policy changes. 
While disinflationary monetary policy will initially harm (or 
fail to benefit) most sectors, as interest rates rise and prices 
decline  certain  groups  should gain.  The  clearest  winners  are 6 
wealth holders.  Since the holding of interest-bearing assets are 
concentrated among the wealthiest, higher interest rates that shift 
the functional distribution of income  toward interest  payments  will 
shift the personal distribution of income toward the wealthiest. 
Further,  in order  to hold an asset, savers require  not  only an 
expected real return but also compensation for expected inflation. 
Assume,  for  instance,  that to hold a given  bond  wealth  holders 
require a 2% expected real return and a 7% inflation premium.  The 
return on the bond would thus be 9%  If inflation declines to 3%, 
then the real return on the bond actually would be 6%.  Thus savers 
receive  a  4%  higher  real  return  than  they  expected,  provided 
involuntarily by borrowers.  In practice wealthier households are 
creditors while businesses, the government, and poorer households 
are debtors.  Thus one would expect an unanticipated disinflation 
to help wealthier households at the expense of the other sectors. 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
A. The Effects  of Disinflationary Policy Across Industries 
Two  recent  papers  (Thorbecke  1995a  and  1995b)  have 
investigated the effects of  monetary policy across industries.  The 
industries  employed  were the 22 for which  industrial production 
data are available from the Federal  Reserve.  These include durable 
and nondurable manufacturing, mining, and utilities.  The responses 
of industrial production over the next 48 months and stock returns 
in the initial month to a monetary contraction were noted.  Data on 
the change in industrial production  following tight  monetary policy 7 
are  useful  because  they  provide  direct  evidence  on the  extent  to 
which  various  industries  are  affected.  Data  on  the  response  of 
stock  returns  to contractionary  policy  are also useful  for several 
reasons.  First,  theoretically  stock  prices  equal  the  expected 
present  value  of  firms'  future  net  cash  flows,  implying  that 
changes  in industry  stock prices  caused  by monetary  policy  should 
foretell  future  changes  in  real  activity  in  that  industry.  As 
Black  (1987) has argued, increases  in stock prices  in a sector more 
often  than  not  presage  increases  in sales,  earnings,  and  capital 
outlays  in  that  sector.  Second,  stock  returns  are  useful  for 
determining  whether  monetary  policy  is  a  systematic  source  of 
uncertainty  with  a risk premium  (a h in the notation  of equation 
(1))  associated  with  it.  Third,  stock  return  data  are  probably 
measured  with  less error than data on industrial production.  Thus 
it  is useful  to examine  the response  of stock  returns  as well  as 
the  response  of industrial  production  to monetary  policy  shocks. 
The  impulse-response  methodology  of Sims  (1980) was  used  to 
note  the  response  of  stock  returns  and  industrial  production  to 
monetary  policy.  This  approach  involves  calculating  unexpected 
changes  in monetary  policy  (the impulse) in period t and noting the 
predicted  effect  on  stock  returns  and  industrial  production  in 
periods  t, t+l,  t+2, etc.  (the responses).  To measure  unexpected 
changes  in monetary  policy  a method  similar  to  that  employed  by 
Christiano,  Eichenbaum,  and Evans  (1994) was used.  They measured 
monetary  policy  by unexpected  changes  in the  federal  funds  rate. 
The funds rate is the rate On overnight  loans between  banks and has 8 
often  been used as the Fed's instrument in implementing monetary 
policy,  Christian0  et  al.  noted  that  including  an  index  of 
sensitive commodity prices along with variables such as GDP  and  the 
GDP  deflator  in a prediction equation for the funds rate produced 
a credible measure of monetary policy  in that it was Correlated in 
the expected  way with variables such as bank reserves, real GDP, 
employment, and prices.  Following their approach Thorbecke (1995a, 
199533)  calculated unexpected changes in the federal funds rate by 
regressing  the funds rate On a constant, six lags of itself, and 
six lags of aggregate industrial production growth, the inflation 
rate, the  log of a commodity price index, the log of nonborrowed 
reserves,  the  log of total reserves, and either the  log of real 
industry output or stock returns in the industry.  The portion of 
the  funds rate that could not be predicted using these variables 
(the residual) was treated as the unexpected change  in the funds 
rate.  The predicted responses of industrial production and stock 
returns  to these funds rate shocks were noted.  Standard errors 
were  calculated  by Monte Carlo methods using 300 draws  from the 
posterior  distribution 
coefficients  (see Doan 
The  sample  period 
of  the  orthogonalized  impulse  response 
(1992)). 
for this estimation was  January  1967 to 
December  1990.  The sample period began in January  1967 because 
this  is the  first month  for which data on commodity  prices are 
available  from the Haver Analytics data tape.  It ends in December 
1990  because  this  is the  last month for which data  on  industry 
stock  returns  and production  (kindly  provided by Jacob Boudoukh) 9 
are available.' 
The  results  indicate that  contractionary  policy  (i.e., an 
unexpected  increases  in  the  funds  rate)  caused  large  and 
statistically significant decreases in stock prices and industrial 
production.  Stock  prices  decreased  immediately.  Industrial 
production  began decreasing after about eight months, reached its 
lowest level at about 18 months, and continued to be affected for 
33 months or more.  Table 1 presents the response of stock returns 
in the initial month by industry.  The coefficients indicate that 
a  one-standard  deviation  unexpected  increase in  the  funds  rate 
depressed industry stock returns by an average of -0.81 percent per 
month.  This  compounds  to  an  average  annual  effect  of  -10.2 
percent.  The  standard  errors  indicate  that  17  of  these 
coefficients are statistically different from zero at at least the 
5 percent level and 20 are at at least the 10 percent level.  Table 
2 presents the responses of industrial production after 18 months 
by  industry.  For  the  11  industries most  affected  by monetary 
policy,  a one-standard-deviation shock to the federal funds rate 
will decrease output after 18 months by an average of 0.9 percent. 
This value implies that the 300 basis point increase in the funds 
rate  implemented by the Fed in 1994 and early 1995 will decrease 
output  in these  industries after 18 months by 4.3 percent.  The 
standard  errors  indicate  that  for  these  11  industries  9  are 
statistically different from zero at at least the 5 percent level 
and IO are at at least the 10 percent level. 
A  very  simple method of combining the  information  in both 10 
Tables in order to determine which industries are more affected is 
to assign industries in each Table a rank of one if they have the 
largest coefficient  (in  absolute value), two if they have the next 
largest coefficient, and so on.  By summing an industry's ranking 
in  both  Tables  it  is  possible  to  obtain  a  measure  of  which 
industries are most affected that combines the information in both 
Tables.  Table  3 presents this measure. 
The  evidence  in Table 3 is consistent with textbook  models 
that  imply  monetary  policy  should  have  the  greatest  effect  on 
interest-rate sensitive and other cyclically-sensitive industries. 
The three most affected industries (lumber;  clay, glass, and stone; 
and primary metals) and the sixth most affected industry (rubber) 
produce inputs to the construction or auto  industries.  The fourth 
most  affected  industry  (transportation  equipment)  includes 
automobiles  and  aircraft.  The  fifth  most  affected  industry 
(furniture),  as  Jones  (1994)  argued,  is  interest-sensitive. 
Capital goods industries (nonelectrical 
electrical machinery, and instruments) 
machinery, metal products, 
take up places six, seven, 
eight, and ten.  The bottom of the list is made up of industries 
producing  nondurables  or  necessities  such  as  food,  textiles, 
utilities,  tobacco,  apparel, and leather.  Thus, consistent with 
traditional  models,  the  evidence  indicates  that  a  monetary 
contraction harms interest  rate-sensitive industries  and has little 
or no effect on industries producing necessities. 11 
B. Contractionary  Monetary  Policy  and Employment 
It  is also  desirable  to  investigate  the  effects  of monetary 
policy  through  employment  changes.  Data  on  employment  from  the 
Haver  Analytics  data tape were only disaggregated  into durable  and 
nondurable  industries,  not  the  22  subcategories  examined  above. 
However,  employment  data  were  available  for  several  sectors  for 
which  industrial  production  data  were  unavailable.  Coppock  and 
Thorbecke  (1995)  used  impulse-response  functions  to  measure  the 
predicted  effect  of federal  funds rate  increases  on employment  in 
these  sectors.  The data and methodology  employed were identical  to 
those  described  in  the  previous  section,  except  that  sectoral 
employment  data  were  substituted  for  data  on  stock  returns  and 
industrial  production.  The  sample  period  extended  from  January 
1967  to  December  1993.  Table  4  presents  the  responses  of 
employment  after  18 months  by  industry.  For  the  4  sectors  most 
affected  by monetary  policy,  a one-standard-deviation  shock to the 
federal  funds  rate will decrease  employment  after  18 months  by an 
average  of  0.5  percent.  This  value  implies  that  the  300  basis 
point  increase  in the funds rate implemented by the Fed in 1994 and 
early  1995  will  decrease  employment  in  these  sectors  after  18 
months  by 2.4 percent.  The standard errors indicate that  6 of the 
10  sectors  exhibit  an  employment  response  that  is  statistically 
different  from zero at at least the 5 percent  level and 8 of the 10 
exhibit  a response  that is statistically  different  at at least the 
10 percent  level. 
The evidence  in Table 4 indicates that a monetary  contraction 12 
has a much  larger effect on employment in durable goods industries 
than in nondurable  goods industries.  This finding mirrors those 
presented  in Table  3, where  the 9 most  affected  industries  all 
produce durable goods and 8 of the 10 least affected industries all 
produced  nondurables. 
Blanchard  (1995) has  discussed  other  ways  that  a  negative 
aggregate  shock  such  as  a  monetary  contraction  can  exert 
distributional  effects through employment changes.  He argued that  1 
unskilled  workers have much larger labor supply elasticities than 
skilled workers.  Decreases  in wages of skilled workers will not 
decrease  their  labor  supply  much,  while  decreases  in  wages  of 
unskilled workers will sharply decrease theirs.  He further argued 
that there  are  llladderil  effects, by which the lower employees on 
the ladder  (unskilled workers) are the first to be let go during a 
contraction.  For  these  reasons,  he  argued  that  a  negative 
aggregate  shock will decrease employment much more for unskilled 
workers than for skilled workers.  Thus those at the lower tail of 
the  income distribution  should be disproportionately  harmed by a 
monetary contraction. 
Blinder and Esaki (1978)  investigated the effects of negative 
macroeconomic  shocks  on  the  distribution  of  income.  Writing 
shortly  before  the  Volcker deflation,  they  found  that  each  one 
percentage point rise in unemployment takes about 0.28% of national 
income  away  from  the  lowest 40% of the  income distribution  and 
gives it to the richest 20%.  These values imply that the Volcker 
deflation,  which  increased  unemployment  by  over  4  percentage 13 
points,  redistributed  more than 1.12% of national  income away from 
the bottom  40% to the top 20%. 
C.  Monetary  Policy,  the  Cost  of  Capital,  and  Capital  Formation 
The  fact  that  monetary  policy  affects  stock  returns, 
industrial production,  and employment makes it plausible that it is 
a systematic  source  of risk  for which  assets  must  pay  a premium. 
Thorbecke  (1995a) found that there was a statistically  significant 
negative risk premium associated with monetary policy  (measured, as 
before,  using  unexpected  changes  in the  funds  rate).  He  also 
found that  all 22 industries had negative  exposures  to funds rate 
shocks.  Most  of  these  exposures,  as  Table  1  documents,  are 
statistically  different  from zero.  These  findings  imply that the 
product PijXj  in equation  (1)  capturing the effect of monetary policy 
risk on the cost of capital ri  is positive.  Thus stocks have to pay 
a  higher  return  because  of  the  risks  they  face  due  to 
contractionary  monetary policy.  Table 5 reports, using percentage 
points  per  year,  the  increment  to the  cost  of  capital  caused  by 
firms'  exposures  to monetary policy. 
The  numbers  are very  large.  They  imply  that  across  the  22 
industries  the  cost  of  capital  increases  on  average  by  7.7 
percentage  points  because  of uncertainty  about  monetary  policy. 
Among the five industries most exposed to monetary policy, the cost 
of capital  increases  on average by 10.5 percentage  points.  These 
results  indicate  that  assets must pay  large positive  premiums  to 
compensate  for their exposures to monetary  policy. 14 
This  evidence  coupled  with  the  evidence  in  the  previous 
sections  imply  that  disinflationary  monetary  policy  will  deter 
capital  formation.  Chirinko  (1993) concluded  that  reductions  in 
output,  as  are  caused  by  contractionary  monetary  policy,  act  as 
major  deterrents  to  investment.  Further,  although  he  found  that 
changes  in  the  cost  of  capital  (ck) had  more  modest  effects, 
increases  of  10  percentage  points  or  more  because  of  a  firm's 
exposure  to  monetary  policy  are  bound  to  reduce  investment. 
Project  managers  are  trained  to  compare  the  returns  on  a  new 
investment  with  cK and  will  be  less  willing  to  invest  if  some 
factor increases  cK  by 10 percentage points.  Further, the evidence 
that monetary  policy has a large effect on industry output and that 
it has a risk premium  associated with it implies that it is one of 
the  macroeconomic  sources of uncertainty discussed  by Pindyck  and 
Solimano  (1993).  Pindyck  and  Solimano  have  argued  that 
macroeconomic  variables that increase uncertainty about future cash 
flows act as major deterrents to investment.  Thus disinflationary 
policy  will  hamper  investment  in  exposed  sectors  by  decreasing 
output,  by  raising  the  cost  of  capital,  and  by  increasing 
uncertainty.  As  Fischer  (1991)  has  argued,  a  factor  such  as 
monetary  policy  that  deters  investment  in  a  sector  will  also 
decrease  that  sector's  long run growth. 
D. Disinflationary  Policy  and  Small  Firms 
Fama  and  French  (1995)  found  that  the  until  1981, 
profitability  showed  little relationship  to firm size.  They  also 15 
found  that profits  of small firms declined much more than profits 
of  large  firms  during  the  1981-82 recession.  Finally,  examining 
data  from  1983  to  1991,  they  found that  while  earnings  of  large 
firms quickly  recovered,  earnings of small firms never really did. 
Rather,  they remained  at historically  low levels.  Fama and French 
argued  that  there  is some unknown  macroeconomic  risk  factor  that 
produces  this size-related  variation in economic performance  among 
firms. 
There  is  much  evidence  indicating  that  the  systematic 
macroeconomic  variable  producing  the  differences  in  economic 
performance  is monetary  policy.  First, the  1981-82  recession  is 
widely  believed  to  have  been  caused  by  tight  monetary  policy 
initiated  by  Fed  Chairman  Paul  Volcker  to  fight  inflation.  The 
expansion  of the middle to late 1980s is similarly believed to have 
been  sparked  by  the  easing  of  monetary  policy  in  late  1982. 
Second,  Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1994) found using  impulse-response 
functions  that  contractionary  monetary  policy  reduces  sales  of 
small  firms much more than sales of large firms.  They also found 
that small firms exhibit an asymmetric response to monetary  policy 
(but  large  firms  do  not).  Small  firms  are harmed  much  more  by 
contractionary  monetary  policy  during  recessions  than  they  are 
helped  by  expansionary  monetary  policy  during  expansions.  Thus, 
small  firms  would  have  been  hurt  more  than  large  firms  by 
contractionary  monetary  policy  in  1981-82  but  helped  less  by 
expansionary  policy  thereafter.  Third,  estimating  the  monetary 
policy exposures  from equation  (1) (the  p's), Thorbecke and Coppock 16 
(1995a)  found  that  small  firms  were  harmed  by  contractionary 
monetary  policy  during  the Volcker  deflation  but  not  helped  from 
the  subsequent  monetary  expansion  beginning  in  late  1982  (while 
large  firms  were  helped  by the  expansion).  Their  estimates  are 
presented  in  Table  6.2  Fourth,  as  discussed  above,  Thorbecke 
(1995a)  found  that  monetary  policy  is  a  systematic  risk  factor 
having a statistically  significant risk premium associated with it. 
Thus  the  evidence  points  to  monetary  policy  as  the  systematic 
factor that contributed  to the 1981-82 slowdown of small firms but 
that  failed  to cause a recovery  among small firms thereafter.3 
This evidence  implies that the environment of disinflationary 
growth  prevailing  after 1982 was obtained at the expense  of small 
firms.  These  firms  were  decimated  by the  1981-82  recession  and 
never recovered.  Evidence that small firms bear a disproportionate 
burden from disinflations,  as Bernanke  (1993) has argued, should be 
of interest  to policy makers. 
E. Disinflationary  Policy  and  Wealth  Holders 
In Section II it was argued that declines  in inflation  should 
benefit wealth holders.  Formal evidence of this has been presented 
by Boudoukh,  Richardson,  and Whitelaw  (1994).  Extending  a result 
that  has  been  demonstrated  by many  researchers,  they  showed  that 
both  expected  and unexpected  increases  in inflation  reduce  stock 
returns.  Inflation  also  lowers  bond  returns  (see Hardouvelis, 
1988).  Thus  higher  inflation  harms  wealth  holders  and  lower 
inflation  benefits  them.  Contractionary  monetary  policy,  which 17 
reduces  inflation,  should  benefit  wealth  holders.  Indeed, 
contractionary  policy  is  frequently  implemented  in  response  to 
demands  by Wall  Street to fight inflation 
and Levy,  1994). 
(see,  for example,  Levy 
One problem  with the conclusion that contractionary  monetary 
policy  helps  wealth  holders  concerns  the  evidence  presented  in 
Table  1.  This  evidence  indicates  that  contractionary  policy 
depresses  stock  returns  in all the industries  examined. 
This evidence that  contractionary policy depresses returns can 
be reconciled  with the claim that disinflationary  policy  benefits 
wealth  holders  by noting the difference between the short and long 
run  responses  of  stock  returns  to monetary  policy.  Initially  a 
monetary  tightening  will reduce forecasts of economic  activity and 
thus stock returns  (see 
tightening  will  reduce 
Tables 1 and 2).  Over time, however,  this 
inflation  (see Christian0  et al.,  1994). 
This decline  in inflation will increase stock returns in the future 
(see Boudoukh  et al., 1994). 
Figure  1 presents  evidence of the differential  short and long 
run effects of monetary policy on stock returns, bond returns,  and 
real  estate  prices.4  It  builds  on  the  finding  of  financial 
economists  that  asset  returns  are  somewhat  forecastable  (see 
Campbell and Mei, 1993).  Unexpected changes in monetary policy not 
only  affect  asset  returns  immediately,  but  also  affect  agents' 
forecasts  of  future  returns.  This  can happen,  for  instance,  if 
news of a monetary  contraction now reduces  forecasts  of inflation 
in the  future.  Figure  1  shows how news of a monetary  tightening 18 
(an unexpected  increase  in the funds rate) affects agents forecasts 
of future  returns  on-the Standard and Poors' Composite  Index,  the 
Salomon Brothers High Grade Corporate Bond Index, and the return to 
homebuilding  stocks.  The methodology and data used in constructing 
this  Figure  are  somewhat  technical  and  thus  discussed  in  the 
Appendix.  The  Figure  indicates  that  although  contractionary 
monetary  policy  depresses  asset  returns  initially  and  in  the 
immediate  future,  it also increases  forecasted returns  further  in 
the future.  Thus while disinflationary  monetary  policy  initially 
harms  wealth  holders,  it benefits  them over time  as decreases  in 
inflation  produce  capital  gains.5  The  evidence  that  stocks  and 
bonds  benefit  over  time  from  disinflationary  monetary  policy 
explains  why Wall Street lobbies for such policies.  Thorbecke  and 
Coppock  (1995b) have  used  industry  stock  return  data  to  present 
more  detailed  evidence  of  the  differential  short  and  long  run 
effects  of monetary  policy on stock returns. 
Moore  (1989)  and  Niggle  (1989)  have  investigated  the 
distributional  effects of disinflationary policy by householdtype- 
poor, middle  income, and rich.  The distribution of asset holdings 
is very  different  across  these  groups.  Whereas  poor  households 
tend to be net debtors, the top 10 percent of wealth  holders  tend 
to  be  net  lenders.  Following  the Volcker  deflation  this  top  10 
percent  held 94.4 percent of all bonds and trusts and 50.8 percent 
of all other interest-bearing assets.  As Moore and Niggle discuss, 
high  interest  rates due to the Volcker deflation caused  the share 
of interest  in personal income to increase almost 5 percent between 19 
1979 and the end of 1982.  Since the ownership of interest  bearing 
assets  is so heavily.concentrated  among the wealthiest,  this shift 
in the  functional  distribution  of income produced  a shift  in the 
personal  distribution  of income towards greater inequality.  Niggle 
estimated  that  the  higher  interest  rates  due  to  contractionary 
monetary  policy  increased  the share of total  income  going  to the 
wealthiest  10 percent  of households  by 3.5 percent.6 
4. DISCUSSION 
It  is  interesting  to  consider  why  the  various  cyclically- 
sensitive  industries  are  affected  by monetary  policy.  Some  are 
affected  because  borrowed  funds are a large share of total costs. 
Gertler  and Gilchrist  (1994) note that small firms  (firms with less 
than  500  employees)  make  up  75  percent  of  sales  in  retail  and 
wholesale  trade  and 90 percent  of sales in construction.  As they 
discuss,  the  predominance  of  small  firms  in  these  industries 
implies  that  their  borrowing  costs will  be higher.  These  higher 
costs  help  explain  why  construction,  retail  trade,  and wholesale 
trade  are the first, third, and fourth most affected  industries  in 
Table  4.  In addition,  data  on the  coverage  ratio  (the ratio  of 
interest  payments  to  the  sum  of  interest  payments  and  profits) 
indicate  that  clay,  glass,  and  stone;  transportation  equipment; 
rubber  and plastics;  nonelectrical  machinery;  and metal  products 
all have high borrowing  costs.  These high costs help  explain why 
these industries are the second, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth 
most  affected  industries  in Table 3. 20 
Other  industries  are  affected  because  their  income 
elasticities  of demand  are large.  In Table  3 the 9 most affected 
industries  are durable goods industries and  (apart from utilities) 
8  of  the  9  least  affected  industries  are  nondurable  goods 
industries.  Part of the reason that nondurable  industries  such as 
food and apparel  are not affected whereas  durable  industries  such 
as machinery  and  transportation  equipment  are  is that  the  former 
are necessities  for which the direct income elasticity of demand is 
low while  the  latter are not and have higher  income elasticities. 
There  are  also  indirect  channels  through  which  a  monetary 
contraction  can affect expenditure patterns.  As Adelman and Taylor 
(1990) discuss,  an economic  slowdown,  by decreasing  income,  will 
cause  household  spending  patterns  to  change.  These  indirect 
effects  will  cause  industries producing  durable goods demanded  by 
households  (e.g.,  furniture  and  appliances)  to  be  harmed  by  a 
monetary  contraction. 
The housing  industry  is strongly affected  on both the demand 
and  supply  sides  by  monetary  policy  (see Dornbusch  and  Fischer, 
1994).  Monetary  policy that causes the mortgage  interest  rate to 
double  will  also  cause  the  monthly  payment  on  a  conventional 
mortgage  to double,  curtailing demand.  However, since contractors 
often  use mortgages  to finance construction  costs,  increases  in 
mortgage  rates  also restrict their ability to build new houses. 
The Social Accounting  Matrix  (SAM) for the U.S. presented  by 
Reinert  and  Roland-Hoist  (1992) provides  additional  insight  into 
why  durable  goods  industries  are  affected  by  monetary  policy. 21 
Their  SAM  indicates  that  30 percent  of  spending  by  construction 
goes  to durable  goods  industries.  Thus  as tight  monetary  policy 
slows  construction,  its demand  for durable  goods  such  as  lumber, 
primary  metals,  and  clay,  glass,  and  stone  plummets.  Their  SAM 
also  indicates  that  30 percent  of  expenditures  by  durable  goods 
industries  is received  by durable  goods  industries.  Thus  as the 
demand  for automobiles  and for 
expenditure  on  other  durable 
metals  and machinery  plummets. 
inputs into construction  decreases, 
goods  industries  such  as  primary 
5. CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  considered  the  distributional  effects  of 
disinflationary  monetary policy.  It has done this by surveying the 
results  of several studies and by bringing new evidence to bear on 
the question.  The evidence indicates that contractionary  monetary 
policy  depresses  output and employment  in interest rate-sensitive 
and  cyclically-sensitive  industries.  These  effects  not  only 
directly  harm  industries  exposed  to  monetary  policy  but  also 
restrict  capital  formation in these sectors, curtailing  their long 
run  growth.  Further,  tight monetary  policy  in 1981-82  decimated 
the earnings  of small firms.  Since that time these earnings  have 
remained  at  historically  low  levels.  Contractionary  policy,  by 
reducing  inflation,  does  yield  benefits  over  time  to  wealth 
holders.  Further,  since the ownership  of interest-bearing  assets 
is concentrated  among the wealthiest,  the shift in the functional 
distribution  of income towards interest payments during the Volcker 22 
deflation  shifted  the  personal  distribution  of  income  towards 
greater  inequality.  Policy makers  should be aware, however,  that 
in  conferring  these  benefits  they  inflict  enormous  damage  on 
interest rate-sensitive  industries and small firms.  If small firms 
are  concentrated  in the most  dynamic  sectors  of the  economy,  as 
Fazzari  (1993)  has  argued,  the  damage  inflicted  on  them  by 
disinflationary  policy  is alarming.  Even  if small  firms  are  not 
"engines  of  growth,"  the  disproportionate  burden  that  they  and 
interest rate-sensitive  industries bear from contractionary  policy 
is troubling.  The Federal Reserve should take these distributional 
effects  into  consideration  before  choosing  to  tighten  monetary 
policy. 23 
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FOOTNOTES 
*I thank  Irma Adelman  for invaluable comments.  Any errors  are my 
own. 
1.  October  1987,  the  month  in  which  stock  prices  dropped  20 
percent  in one day, was excluded  from the estimation. 
2.  Thorbecke  and  Coppock  (1995a) also measured  monetary  policy 
during  the  Volcker  deflation  period  using  unexpected  changes  in 
nonborrowed  reserves  (NBR).  The Federal Reserve targeted NBR over 
the October  1979 - August 1982 period.  Using unexpected  changes in 
NBR they also found that contractionary monetary policy had a large 
negative  effect  on  small  firms'  returns  during  the  1979-1982 
period. 
3.  The  evidence  that  small  firms  were  harmed  by  the  Volcker 
deflation  but not helped by the subsequent expansion could reflect 
no new effect  beyond that discussed  in Section 3A.  This could be 
true  if  small  firms  are  more  prevalent  in  cyclically-sensitive 
industries.  To test for this returns on the 11 industries  in Table 
1 most exposed to monetary policy were regressed over the 1982-1987 
period  on  funds  rate  shocks  and the  other  variables  employed  by 
Thorbecke  and  Coppock  (1995a).  For  all  except  the  10th  most 
exposed  industry, the monetary expansion over this period caused a 
large,  statistically  significant  increase in stock returns.  Thus 
the  asymmetric  effect  of  monetary  policy  in good  and  bad  times 
applies  to  small  firms  specifically  rather  than  to  cyclically- 
sensitive  firms generally. 
4.  The methodology  used in constructing  Figure 1 was designed  to 
employ  assets  whose  prices  vary  continuously  in  speculative 
markets.  Thus real estate prices themselves are inappropriate.  As 
a proxy, the returns on homebuilding stocks, which vary sensitively 
with  real estate prices, were used. 
5.  The  financial  press often offers  a similar explanation  when 
discussing  why  funds  rate  increases  depress  stock  prices. 
Hurtado  (1994),  discussing  the  98  point  drop  in  the  Dow  Jones 
Industrial  Average  that occurred on 4 February 1994 following news 
of  a  Fed  contraction,  stated  that  if the  Fed move  improved  the 
inflationary  outlook, the stock market could bounce back.  Laderman 
(1994)  argued  that  7  of  the  last  8  times  that  the  Fed  pushed 
interest rates up from their cyclical lows, the stock market ended 
up  increasing  over time. 
6.  As  Moore  (1989) and  Niggle  (1989) discuss,  there  is  some 
ambiguity  to the  finding that higher  interest rates  benefits  the 
wealthy  because  it also produces capital losses on existing stocks 
and bonds.  However,  as Figure  1 shows, these capital  losses  are 
offset  over  time  as tighter  policy  causes  inflation  to  decline. 
The intense lobbying by Wall Street for disinflationary policy also 
indicates  that the effect of these capital losses are second order 
compared  to the gains from tighter monetary policy. 27 
Table  1:  Impulse.Response  of  Industry  Stock  Returns  in  Initial 
Month  to One-Standard  Deviation  Shock to the Federal  Funds Rate 
Industry 
Response to One-Standard 
Deviation Shock to FF  (Std. Error) 
Lumber  -0.0142** 
Mining  -0.0134** 
Furniture  -0.00950** 
Clay,  Glass,  and Stone  -0.00945** 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  -0.00894** 
Paper  -0.00884** 
Primary  Metals  -0.00879** 
Transportation  Equipment  -0.00803** 
Rubber  and Plastics  -0.00791** 
Misc.  Manufacturing  -0.00776* 
Metal  Products  -0.00774** 
Food and Beverage  -0.00773** 
Petroleum  Products  -0.0076** 
Instruments  -0.00741** 
Electrical  Machinery  -0.00735* 
Printing  and Publishing  -0.00664** 
Utilities  -0.00662** 
Leather  -0.00662** 
Chemicals  -0.00642** 
Textiles  -0.00635* 
Tobacco  -0.00583** 























Source  : Thorbecke  (1995a) 
*Significant  at the 10% level. 
**Significant  at the 5% level. 28 
Table  2: Impulse  Response  of Industry  Industrial  Production  after 
18 Months to One-Standard  Deviation Shock to the Federal Funds Rate 
Industry 
Response  to One-Standard 
Deviation  Shock to FF  (Std. Error) 
Primary  Metals  -0.00838** 
Clay,  Glass,  and Stone  -0.00797** 
Transportation  Equipment  -0.00750** 
Rubber  and Plastics  -0.00671* 
Lumber  -0.00644** 
Electrical  Machinery  -0.00584** 
Chemicals  -0.00563** 
Metal  Products  -0.00523 
Instruments  -0.00490** 
Furniture  -0.00474** 
Petroleum  -0.00454** 
Textiles  -0.00383 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  -0.00273 
Misc.  Manufacturing  -0.00251 
Paper  -0.00205 
Utilities  -0.00167 
Printing  and Publishing  -0.00164 
Apparel  -0.00156 
Food and Beverage  -0.000481 
Tobacco  0.000199 
Mining  0.000239 























Source : Thorbecke  (199533) 
*Significant  at the 10% level. 
**Significant  at the 5% level. 29 
Table  3: Combined  Ranking  of Industries  in Tables  1 and 2 
Industry  Combined Ranking 
Lumber  6 
Clay,  Glass,  and Stone  6 
Primary  Metals  8 
Transportation  Equipment  11 
Furniture  13 
Rubber  and Plastics  13 
Nonelectrical  Machinery  18 
Metal  Products  19 
Electrical  Machinery  21 
Paper  21 
Instruments  23 
Mining  23 
Petroleum  24 
Misc.  Manufacturing  24 
Chemicals  26 
Food and Beverages  31 
Textiles  32 
Utilities  33 
Printing  and Publishing  33 
Tobacco  40 
Apparel  40 
Leather  40 
Note:  The combined  ranking  is the sum of the each  industry's 
rank in Table 1 and Table 2.  In each Table an industry is assigned 
a  rank  of  one  if  it  has  the  largest  coefficient  (in  absolute 
value),  two  if it has the  second largest coefficient,  and so on. 
The  combined  ranking  thus  synthesizes  the  information  in  both 
Tables  to  provide  a  rough  measure  of  which  industries  are  most 
affected  by monetary  policy. 30 
Table  4: Impulse Response of Sectoral Employment after 18 Months to 
One-Standard  Deviation  Shock to the Federal Funds Rate 
Response  to One-Standard 
Sector  Deviation  Shock to FF  (Std. Error) 
Construction  -0.00735**  (0.00253) 
Durable  Goods  -0.00527**  (0.00187) 
Retail  Trade  -0.00286**  (0.00087) 
Wholesale  Trade  -0.00284**  (0.00088) 
Finance,  Insurance, 
Real  Estate  -0.00217**  (0.00069) 
Services  -0.00167**  (0.00056) 
Nondurable  Goods  -0.00116*  (0.00077) 
Government  -0.00106*  (0.00058) 
Transportation  -0.00084  (0.00091) 
Mining  0.000845  (0.00338) 
Source  : Coppock  and Thorbecke  (1995) 
*Significant  at the 10% level. 
**Significant  at the 5% level. 31 
Table  5. InCreaSe  in  Cost  of Capital  Due to  Exposure  to  Monetary 
Policy 
Increase in Cost of Capital 





Rubber  & Plastics 
Primary  Metals 
Furniture 
Textiles 
Transportation  Equipment 
Nonelectrical  Machinery 
Electrical  Machinery 
Metal  Products 
Petroleum 
Food  & Beverage 
Miscellaneous  Manufacturing 
Leather 
Instruments 



























Source  : Thorbecke  (1995a) and calculations  by the author. 32 
Table  6. The  Exposures  of  Portfolio  Stock  Returns  to  Unexpected 
Changes  in the Federal Funds Rate 
Volcker  Deflation  Period  (1979:lO - 1982:lOI 
Portfolio  Exnosure  t-statistic 
First  Decile  (smallest)  -1.33**  -2.20 
Second  Decile‘ 
Third  Decile 
Fourth  Decile 
Fifth  Decile 
Sixth  Decile 
Seventh  Decile 
Eighth  Decile 
Ninth  Decile 
Tenth  Decile  (largest) 
-0.77  -1.12 
-0.87  -1.36 
-1.09*  -1.72 
-1.11*  -1.82 
-0.99  -1.64 
-0.99  -1.66 
-0.84  -1.55 
-0.75  -1.31 
-0.70  -1.27 
Post Deflationary  Expansion  f1982:8 - 1987:9) 
Portfolio  Exposure  t-statistic 
First  Decile  (smallest)  -2.27  -1.49 
Second  Decile  -2.60**  -1.99 
Third  Decile  -3.11**  -2.35 
Fourth  Decile  -3.29**  -2.57 
Fifth  Decile  -3.37**  -2.66 
Sixth Decile  -2.94**  -2.41 
Seventh  Decile  -3.15**  -2.62 
Eighth  Decile  -2.63**  -2.21 
Ninth  Decile  -2.55**  -2.25 
Tenth  Decile  (largest)  -2.13*  -1.94 
Note:  The first sample period extended to October  1982 rather 
than August  because  the Jacobian  cross-products  matrix  was not of 
full  rank  when  the  sample  ended  in August,  causing  some  of  the 
estimates  to be biased.  For those estimates that were  not biased 
(including those for the ten decile stock returns) the results were 
similar  whether  the sample ended  in August or October. 
Source:  Thorbecke  and Coppock  (1995a) 
*Significant  at the 10% level. 
**Significant  at the 5% level. S&P  500  Stock  Index 
Solomon  Brothers  Corporate  Bond  Index 
Fcmebui  ldlng  Stocks 
Figure  1. Covariance  Between 
Unexpected  Changes in the Federal 
Funds  Rate  and  Changes  in  the 
Contemporaneous  Forecasts  of 
Future  Returns  (Scaled  by  the 
Variance of the Unexpected Change 
in the Funds Rate). 33 
APPENDIX 
Financial economists have recently found that future asset 
returns are partly forecastable  based on past values of variables. 
For  instance, Campbell and Mei  (1993)  forecasted asset returns 
(ri,t)  based on a set of k macroeconomic variables (x,,,.,)  known in 
the previous period: 
qt  =  %lxl,t-1  +  ai,2x2,t-l  +  . . .  +  ai,kxk,t-l  +  ei,t  (Al) 
Campbell and Mei assumed that these macroeconomic variables can 
also be forecasted based on lagged values of themselves: 
Xl,,  =  P1,lx,,t-l  +  Pl,zx2,t-1  +  *  l  -  +  Pl,kXk,t-1  +  ul,t 
X2,t  =  P2,1xl,t-1  +  ??2.2x2,t-l  +  - - -  +  ??2,kXk,t-I  +  U2,t 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (A21 
Xk,t  =  Pk,lX1,t-1  +  Pk,2X2,t-1  +  - - -  +  Pk,kXk,t-1  +  uk,t 
Equations  (Al) and  (A2) can be rewritten in matrix notation by 
letting: 
a’,  =  {a,,,# q2r  .  .  .  ,  qk},  x’t  =  k,t,  x2&#  .  -.  I  Xk,t)r 
u’t  =  b,tr  U2,tr  l  .  l  ,  uk,t]  and 
Pl.1 
P2,l 
P=  .  .  . 




Pl.2  ***  P1.k 
P2.2  l  .  .  P2.k 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
Pk,2  .*.  Pk,k 
- 
.  . 
(A3) 
.)  and  (A21  can then be written 
ri.t  =  a',x,.,  + e,,, 
xt  =  Pxt.l  + u,  (A4) 
In equation (A31  e,,,  represents  the portion of the return on asset 
i in period t that was not predictable  using information  available 
in period  t-l.  In equation  (A4)  ut  represents new information 34 
about the macroeconomic variables xlt that was not predictable in 
period t-l.  If the first  macroeconomic  variable  measures monetary 
policy  using  the  federal  funds rate,  then u,,,  represents  the 
unexpected change in the funds rate.  One might want to examine 
whether an unexpected change in the funds rate is related to an 
unexpected  change  in  the  asset return.  One  way  to  do  this, 
advocated  by Campbell  and  Mei (1993), is to  examine  the  coefficient 
cov(e,,,,u,,,)  /var(u,,,)  ,  where  cov  represents  the  unconditional 
covariance and var represents the unconditional variance.  This 
coefficient is similar  to  what one  would  obtain from  regressing  the 
unexpected change in the asset return in the initial  month on the 
unexpected change in the funds rate. 
The equations presented above also contain information about 
future months.  New information  about the macroeconomic  variables 
(u,)  affect forecasts  of the  macroeconomic  variables  in the future. 
For instance, news of contractionary  monetary policy will affect 
forecasts of output and prices in future periods.  Equation (A4) 
implies that news of u,  will change the forecast  of x~+~  in period 
t by Pu,, the forecast of x~+~  in period t by P'u,,  the forecast of 
xtc3  in period t by P3u,,  and so on.  But by equation (A3), these 
changes in the period t forecasts of the macroeconomic variables 
x,+~  for j = 1,2,3,  .  .  . will affect period t forecasts of future 
asset returns ri,t+,+l.  As an example, forecasts  of lower inflation 
in period t+j due to contractionary  monetary policy in period t 
will affect period t forecasts of asset returns in period t+j+l. 
The forecast of ri,t+l  in period t will change  by aliUt,  the forecast 35 
of  qtt2  in period t will change by al,Pu,,  the forecast of ri,t+3  in 
period t will change  -by  a'iP2ut,  and SO on.  It is then  possible to 
examine the relationship between unexpected changes in the funds 
rate  in period  t  (u1J  and  changes in  the  forecasts of  asset 
returns in future  months. This can be done again by looking at the 
covariance of unexpected  changes  in the funds  rate in  period t  with 
changes in the period t forecast of asset returns in period t+j 
divided by the variance of the unexpected  change in the funds rate 
in period t.  This would give a series  of coefficients  of the form: 
kOV(U1,,r  a+,)/var(u,,,L  cov(u,,,,a',Pu,)/var(u,,,), 
cov(u,,,,  a',P2ut)/varlu,,,),  cov(u1,,,al,P3u,)/var(u,,,), 
These coefficients measure the correlation between 
change in the funds rate in period t and changes in 
.  .  . 1 
an unexpected 
the forecasts 
of future asset returns  made in  period t.  It is these  coefficients 
that are plotted in Figure 1. 
The asset return data used in calculating these coefficients 
are the returns on the Standard and Poorst Composite Stock Index 
and  the Salomon Brothers High Grade Corporate Bond Index, both 
obtained  from  Ibbotson  Associates  (1994)  I  and  the  return  on 
homebuilding  stocks,  obtained  from  the  Standard  and  Poors' 
Statistical Service.  The macroeconomic variables used are  the 
federal funds rate, the dividend  yield on the Standard and Poors' 
Index, the growth rate of industrial production, the log of  an 
index of sensitive commodity prices, and the real interest rate. 
Data  on  the first four variables were obtained from the Haver 
Analytics  data  tape.  The  mnemonics  for  these variables  are, 36 
respectively,  FFED,  SDY5COM,  IPN,  and  PZALL.  Data  on  the  real 
interest  rate were obtained  from Ibbotson Associates  (1994).  The 
sample period for the Standard & Poors' Stock Index and the Salomon 
Brothers'  Bond index extended  from January  1967 to December  1993. 
The  sample  period  for homebuilding  stocks  extended  from  January 
1974 to December  1993. 